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EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS FOR DRUG APPROVALS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY CURES ACT: A CONTINUED TREND TOWARDS
VALUING ACCESS OVER SAFETY FOR PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS
Farrah R. Raja*
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), tasked with
promoting and protecting public health, has long been recognized
as the gatekeeper for drugs. However, the agency has not been
immune from criticism from patients and industry stakeholders
over its time-consuming and clinical data-driven approval
processes, alleged to hinder potentially effective drugs from
reaching the market as quickly as they could. In December of
2016, the signing of the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”), a
piece of “landmark” legislation that alters the rigorous approval
processes for drugs by allowing data other than those derived from
clinical trials into the approval process consideration, came as a
triumph to these critics. These critics lauded the legislation as a
win for both patient access and innovation. However, this
“triumph” may come at an expense: safety. This Recent
Development examines the key, relevant provisions of the Cures
Act relating to the different standards of evidence required for
drug approvals, and how the implementation of these provisions
will impact the future of safe and effective drugs, given our current
framework for drug approvals.
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I: INTRODUCTION
The recent enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act1 into law
has ignited a sense of hope and optimism in patients and other
industry stakeholders who are disillusioned with regulatory
obstacles that impede the ability of drugs to enter the market in an
expeditious manner.2 The legislation is acclaimed for its attempts
to advance new therapies and treatments by accelerating the
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1
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
2
Elaine Schattner, Why Patients Support the 21st Century Cures Act, FORBES
(Nov.
30,
2016,
9:54
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaineschattner/2016/11/30/why-patients-supportthe-21st-century-cures-act/#12a60850ac37.
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Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval3 process for new
drugs.4 Patients like Janet Freeman-Daily, a sixty-year-old woman
who has been living with advanced lung cancer for the past five
years, see the bill as a victory over “paperwork” hurdles that
prevent potentially effective drugs from reaching the market.5 For
Freeman-Daily, the Cures Act represents an opportunity to
accelerate drug approval for oncogene-driven cancers.6 Given the
complexity surrounding drug discovery, including the inherent risk
involved in scientific uncertainty, approving a new drug for
market, by no means, is a simple process.7 It can take anywhere
from ten to fifteen years to approve a new drug, and the estimated
costs can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars.8 The Cures
Act should alleviate the many concerns patients and industry
stakeholders have about a lengthy and time-consuming approval
process. Critics, like law professor Ana Santos Rutschman,9
however, worry that hastening the drug approval process will not
come without costs.10 According to Santos Rutschman, the Cures

3

It is important to distinguish between drug approval and the FDA’s review
process for drugs at the onset. Drug approval encompasses all of the time that
goes into the development of the drug, including initial research, the discovery
of the medicine, preclinical development testing, and clinical trial testing. Drug
review, on the other hand, refers to the FDA’s review of all of the data
submitted with the new drug’s application for market approval. The FDA’s Drug
Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm.
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2017).
4
130 Stat. 1033.
5
Schattner, supra note 2.
6
Id.
7
BERNARD LO & MARILYN J. FIELD, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE, 23 (2009) (ebook).
8
Id.
9
Professor Santos Rutschman is the Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and
Intellectual Property at DePaul University College of Law. Ana Santos
Rutschman, DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF L., http://law.depaul.edu/faculty-andstaff/faculty-a-z/Pages/ana-santos-rutschman.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
10
Ana Santos Rutschman, Faster Drug & Medical Device Approvals Under
21st Century Cures Act Raises Patient Safety Concerns, DRUG DISCOVERY &
DEV. (Jan. 16, 2017, 8:54 AM), http://www.dddmag.com/article/2017/01/faster-
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Act may represent a sacrifice between safety and efficacy of drugs
in exchange for quicker delivery to patients.11
President Obama signed the Cures Act into law in December of
2016 after it passed both the House and the Senate with bipartisan
support. The bill, spanning almost 1,000 pages in length,
champions several initiatives in addition to providing funding for
these initiatives.12 The bill authorizes funding for countering the
opioid epidemic,13 cancer research through the “Moonshot
Initiative,”14 mental health parity implementation,15 and precision
medicine efforts.16 The aforementioned initiatives have garnered
praise from the majority of people, however, the most contentious
parts of the Cures Act are those that address the evidentiary
standards that can be used in the FDA’s approval process for
drugs.17
This Recent Development argues that while the Cures Act’s
provisions that relax the evidentiary standards used in the FDA
approval processes for drugs may help patients access drug
treatments and therapies more quickly and might appear to further
innovation by removing regulatory barriers, the hastened process
authorized by these provisions poses a threat to both patient safety
and innovation in developing effective treatments. This paper
proceeds in six parts. Part II examines the FDA and how its
regulatory drug standards have evolved since its inception, and
increased utilization of expedited drug development and approval
programs. Part III explores the legislative history behind the Cures
Act. Part IV discusses the likely impact of the Cures Act’s FDA
provisions that encourage the use of real-world evidence, surrogate
endpoints, patient outcome data, and data summaries in drug
drug-medical-device-approvals-under-21st-century-cures-act-raises-patientsafety-concerns.
11
Id.
12
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
13
Id. § 1003.
14
Id. § 1001.
15
Id. § 13001–07.
16
Id. § 2011.
17
Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The 21st Century Cures Act—Will it
Take Us Back in Time?, NEW ENG. J. MED. 2473, 2474 (2015).
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approvals. Part V examines the broader policy implications of the
Cures Act on patients, stakeholders, and the legitimacy of the
FDA. Finally, Part VI will conclude.
II: THE FDA - TRACING ITS EVOLUTION
In an effort to place the significance of the Cures Act’s drug
alteration provisions into context, this section introduces the reader
to the FDA and the historical evolution of its regulations and
control. Part A provides background information about the FDA
and its role in the development and marketing of drugs. Part B
supplies a more thorough discussion of the agency’s review
processes for approving drugs than was mentioned in the
Introduction.18 Part C gives an overview of special approval
pathways that have been used by the FDA. Part D examines past
instances of less than rigorous drug approvals, the negative
repercussions that subsequently resulted, and what these past
situations can teach us about what the Cures Act may hold for the
future of drug safety and efficacy.
A. The FDA: The Gatekeeper
The FDA has long been regarded as the gatekeeper of the
American pharmaceutical industry.19 The FDA has the power “to
sculpt medical and scientific concepts,”20 to determine which drugs
can enter the market, to determine how medical success is defined,
and to “influence how citizens live and die.”21 Undoubtedly, the
agency’s impact on patients’ lives and the entire pharmaceutical
industry is far-reaching.
While the FDA was originally formed in 1906 with the passage
of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906—that was aimed at
preventing the adulteration and mislabeling of food and drug
products—the scope of the agency’s regulatory authority over the
pharmaceutical industry was not fully realized until the passage of
18

See supra PART I.
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 1 (2010).
20
Id.
21
Id.
19
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the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)22 in 1938.23
The FDCA was passed in the aftermath of the elixir sulfanilamide
tragedy24 that took the lives of approximately one hundred people.25
The drug was not tested for safety, as was the case for many new
drugs, since prior to the enactment of the FDCA, new drugs did not
undergo safety scrutiny.26 The FDCA gave the FDA stricter control
over drugs.27 The FDCA also further strengthened the agency’s
ability to enforce the new law.28
While the enactment of the FDCA addressed safety concerns
associated with drugs, there was still no requirement that drug
firms prove the effectiveness of the drugs for which they sought
approval.29 This changed with the monumental passage of the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments30 to the FDCA. Under the
1962 Amendments, drug companies now had to prove not only that
the drug was safe for its intended use, but also provide “substantial
evidence of effectiveness for the product’s intended use.”31 The
most sweeping change that the 1962 Amendments brought,
however, was the requirement that evidence supporting the drug
come from “adequate and well-controlled studies.”32 Without a
22

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-17, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938).
23
CARPENTER, supra note 19, at 1.
24
During the elixir sulfanilamide tragedy, 105 individuals died after taking
the drug elixir sulfanilamide, intended to treat infections. The drug was later
found to have a toxic ingredient in its solution. Carol Ballentine, Taste of
Raspberries: Taste of Death: The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, U.S. FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
(Jun.
1981),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/Sulfanil
amideDisaster/.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See 52 Stat. 1040.
28
Id.
29
Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.
(Jan.––Feb.
2006),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/Promoti
ngSafeandEffectiveDrugsfor100Years/.
30
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
31
Meadows, supra note 29; see also 76 Stat. 781.
32
Meadows, supra note 29 (emphasis added).
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doubt, the Amendments thrust the importance of relying on
thorough and controlled effectiveness studies into the forefront.33
As Part B discusses, this reliance on clinical data from controlled
trials is fundamental for drug approval.34
B. FDA Review Processes for Drugs
The process of getting a new drug approved on the market is a
process that is rigorous and time-consuming for both the agency
and for drug sponsors. Following its initial manufacture and before
it can enter the market for sale, a drug must demonstrate
“substantial effectiveness”35 and safety for its intended use.36 The
FDA makes this determination after reviewing results from clinical
trials submitted by the drug manufacturer at various stages in the
process.37
There are roughly seven stages for new drug development and
review.38 The first stage, a very crucial one, begins when drug
sponsors submit an Investigational New Drug Application
(“IND”). During this stage in the process, sponsors must submit
results from “preclinical” testing in laboratory animals, in addition
to a proposed plan for human testing.39 If the results do not
demonstrate “reasonable safety,”40 the FDA can reject the drug for
testing in humans, thereby ending its review.41 Review of the IND
33

Jeremy A. Greene et al., Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals – The
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments at 50, NEW ENG. J. MED 1481 (2012).
34
See infra FDA Review Processes for Drugs.
35
“Substantial evidence of effectiveness” is shown when qualified experts
have reviewed data from adequate and well-controlled studies, and can conclude
from the results of the data that the drug will have its intended effect for its
prescription and labeling uses. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L.
No. 75-17, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
36
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective,
supra note 3.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Reasonable safety is demonstrated when, based on scientific evidence, the
probable benefits from using the drug for its intended use outweigh the probable
risks associated with using the drug. 52 Stat. 1040.
41
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective,
supra note 3.
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is a joint collaborative process that involves both the FDA and an
Institutional Review Board,42 a panel of scientists and nonscientists whose main objective in studies involving human
research subjects is to review and assess the study itself, the
study’s consent procedures, and the study’s safety protocols.43
Once the FDA deems the study “reasonably safe” for testing in
humans, the sponsor may begin clinical testing, consisting of three
phases: Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3.44 During Phase 1 testing,
studies are conducted on the drug’s impact on healthy volunteers,
with the main objective targeted at finding out the drug’s side
effects on humans.45 Once Phase 1 testing is completed and
reviewed, if the results do not show “unacceptable toxicity,” the
drug may move on to Phase 2 testing.46 While Phase 1 testing is
concerned with a drug’s safety, Phase 2 testing is most concerned
with the drug’s effectiveness.47 The subjects involved in Phase 2
testing are individuals with certain illnesses or diseases.48 During
this Phase, through controlled trials, researchers compare similar
patients who are given a placebo or different kind of drug in place
of the drug being tested.49 Through Phase 2 testing, the drug’s
safety is still evaluated, in addition to the short-terms side effects
of the drug.50 Once Phase 2 testing is complete and has
demonstrated that the drug is effective, the FDA and drug sponsors
must come to an agreement on how Phase 3 testing will proceed.51
42

“[Institutional Review Board]s approve the clinical trial protocols, which
describe the type of people who may participate in the clinical trial, the schedule
of tests and procedures, the medications and dosages to be studied, the length of
the study, the study’s objectives, and other details. IRBs make sure the study is
acceptable, that participants have given consent and are fully informed of their
risks, and that researchers take appropriate steps to protect patients from harm.”
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective,
supra note 3.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
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Phase 3 studies are targeted at gathering additional information
about the drug’s safety and effectiveness by (1) studying the drugs
effects on different populations, (2) using different dosages, and
(3) studying the drug’s effects when used in combination with
other drugs.52 Phase 3 testing concludes with a review meeting
between the drug sponsor and the FDA.
After the three phases of testing are complete, the sponsor
seeks the approval of the FDA for marketing the drug in the United
States by submitting a New Drug Application (“NDA”).53 The
NDA must include all evidence gathered from the three phases of
clinical testing, including all animal and human data, the procedure
by which the drug is manufactured, and information about how the
drug behaves in humans.54 The FDA can refuse to “file” an NDA
for review, but must do so within a sixty-day period, though
refusing to file occurs infrequently.55
Once the FDA approves a drug and it is ready for the market,
the FDA’s scrutiny of the drug continues.56 The FDA can require
drug sponsors to submit additional data from studies after drug has
obtained market approval.57 These studies are particularly
important because some safety concerns can only come to light
after patients have taken the drugs and have reported adverse
outcomes. The FDA’s management and handling of postmarketing studies, however, have been the subject of numerous
concerns.58 According to the a 2015 report by the Government
Accountability Office,59 these concerns included that (1) the FDA’s

52

Id.
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are Safe and Effective,
supra note 3.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Step 5: FDA Post-Market Safety Monitoring, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405579.htm.
(last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
57
Id.
58
See
H.R.
REP.
GAO-16-192
(2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674183.pdf.
59
The Government Accountability Office is an independent and nonpartisan
government agency that is primarily tasked with investigating how public funds
53
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data on tracked issues was not complete, and (2) post-market study
data was often outdated and contained inaccuracies.60 While postmarket studies can be extremely helpful, especially when it comes
to using them to support withdrawing a drug from the market, they
are ineffective if not properly managed.
C. Special Approval Pathways: An Overview
As Part B61 of the paper illustrates, there are a rigorous set of
procedures that must be followed before a drug can be marketed
for sale in the United States. While these procedures are in place to
ensure safety and effectiveness and to weed out drugs that pose
great risk and little benefit, these procedures can also cause great
delay in allowing potentially effective drugs to be reviewed and
marketed.62 This is particularly problematic for the individual
living with a life-threatening disease, for which there is not any
other treatment available.63 Recognizing this dilemma, the FDA
has worked with Congress to create “special approval pathways”64
that speed up the development and review process for drugs that
meet certain criteria.65 Since the late 1980s, the number of special
approval pathways has routinely been increasing.66
Over the past two decades, five programs have been created to
speed up drug approvals and reviews for illnesses that are either
rare or life threatening, and for which no other treatment is
available or for which the new drug suggests greater therapeutic

are
used.
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
60
H.R. REP. GAO-16-192, supra note 58, at 23.
61
See FDA Review Processes for Drugs, supra Part B.
62
Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Trends in Utilization of FDA Expedited Drug
Development and Approval Programs, 1987-2014; cohort study, 1 BRIT. MED. J.
2 (2015), http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/351/bmj.h4633.full.pdf.
63
Id.
64
Special approval pathways have typically been applied to drugs that treat
“serious” diseases, and are more readily used when a drug is the first treatment
for the serious disease or is advantageous over existing treatments for the
disease. Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
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advantage over existing therapies.67 The five programs are (1)
orphan drug,68 (2) fast track,69 (3) priority review,70 (4) accelerated
approval,71 and (5) breakthrough therapy.72
The number of drugs approved within one of these special
approval pathways has been increasing over the past two decades,
perhaps beyond what the FDA intended.73 According to studies, in
2013, 56% of twenty-seven new drugs were approved under a
special pathway approval program, and twelve of these drugs
qualified for more than one program.74 The same study revealed
that despite the increase in approvals under these programs, many
of the drugs did not meet the qualifying criteria as being
“innovative.”75 In fact, many suggest that approvals under special
pathways have become the rule and not the exception.76 The
dilemma posed by the Cures Act is whether additional methods for
expediting drug development and delivery are needed, when
67

Id.
Under the orphan drug program, a drug qualifies only if it is intended to
treat a disease that occurs in less than 200,000 people per year in the United
States. This designation does not change the statutory standards, however
orphan drugs have been shown to be approved based on “small, nonrandomized, unblended, single arm trials.” Kesselheim et al., supra note 62 at 2.
69
A drug qualifies for fast track designation if it treats a “life threatening” or
“severely debilitating” disease. This designation allows qualifying drugs to be
approved after just one Phase 2 study. Id.
70
A qualifying drug under priority review designation is one that “seems to
offer therapeutic advance over available therapy.” This does not change the
statutory standard for approval. Id.
71
Under accelerated approval designation, a qualifying drug is one that treats
“serious or life threatening illnesses,” allowing surrogate endpoints that are
“reasonable likely to predict patient benefit” to be used. Id.
72
A drug is eligible for breakthrough designation if it is one that “treats a
serious disease for which preliminary clinical evidence suggests substantial
improvement over existing therapies on one or more clinically important
endpoints.” This does not change the statutory standard for approval. Id.
73
Id.
74
Kesselheim et al., supra note 62 at 2.
75
Id.
76
Margot Sanger-Katz, Speedy Drug Approvals Have Become the Rule, Not
the
Exception,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
1,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/upshot/speedy-drug-approvals-havebecome-the-rule-not-the-exception.html.
68

420
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approval pathways already exist, and evidence shows they are
utilized very frequently.
D. A Trends Towards Increased Expedited Drug Development and
Approval Programs
While special approval pathways have resulted in revolutionary
drugs, they have also caused great controversy.77 Their increase has
brought about more drug applications and approvals, but for the
most part, most of the drugs approved under these expedited
development programs have not shown “noticeable clinical
advances.”78 This debunks the belief that the FDA’s clinical-data
driven process hinders innovation. The FDA’s history is laced with
tragedies that have brought great scrutiny to the agency’s actions.79
These tragedies have motivated the FDA to implement regulatory
reforms.80 In particular, many argue that the pharmaceutical
industry’s “capture” of the FDA and an increase in special
approval pathways are what have led to some of the country’s
worst drug disasters at the hands of the FDA.81
There are many problems associated with special regulatory
designations that allow for drug approvals based on less rigorous
data.82. Notably, there are two problems: (1) basing approvals on
less rigorous data, and (2) inadequate post-approval procedures for
these drugs.83 For instance, the case study of gemtuzumab, known
by its brand name “Mylotarg,” illustrates the dangers of using
surrogate endpoints84 under accelerated approval pathways.85
Mylotarg was approved in 2000 for acute myeloid leukemia based

77

Kesselheim et al., supra note 62, at 2.
Id. at 1.
79
Sue McGrath, Only a Matter of Time: Lessons Unlearned at the Food and
Drug Administration Keep Americans at Risk, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 603 (2005).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Kesselheim et al., supra note 62, at 2–6.
83
Id.
84
”Surrogate endpoints consist of markers such as laboratory measurements
or radiographic images, and contrast with clinical endpoints such as reduction in
patient symptoms or mortality.” Id. at 2.
85
Id. at 2.
78
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on surrogate endpoints,86 however a decade later, it was removed
from the market after confirmatory post-approval studies found it
showed “no efficacy and increased mortality.”87 However, the issue
is that the FDA often delays or fails to complete post-marketing
studies.88 Much of the information about a drug’s effectiveness is
learned after the drug has been approved through post-approval
studies.89
Expedited approval processes are often created with the belief
that they will allow new and innovative drugs to reach the
market.90 While special approval pathways have led to more
approvals, they have also been used for drugs that present no
special advantage, thereby presenting greater risk and little benefit
to patients.91 Given the startling number of drugs approved each
year based on limited data, the Cures Act drug provisions will
exacerbate this problem.
III: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CURES ACT: A SUSPECTED
HOST OF SPONSORS, SUPPORT FOR THE ACT, AND OPPOSITION
TO THE ACT
This section will introduce the reader to a very brief legislative
history behind the Cures Act to include its supporters and its
critics. This legislative history of the Cures Act is included in order
to give the reader insight into the circumstances that catapulted the
passage of the law.
The strongest proponents of the Cures Act drug provisions
were pharmaceutical industry stakeholders.92 Almost 1,300
86

Id.
Id. (“Approving drugs on the basis of surrogate endpoints, for example, can
be risky, since promising surrogates may later be found not to accurately predict
actual changes in patient health outcomes.”).
88
Kesselheim et al., supra note 62, at 5.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1–2.
91
Id. at 6.
92
Dennis Thompson, Congress Passes 21st Century Cures Act with Billions
for New Research, Treatment, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:34 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/21st-century-cures-act-congress-health-carepassed/.
87
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lobbyists from pharmaceutical companies were largely responsible
for the passage of the entire bill, not shocking, given the financial
incentive the bill provides for pharma companies.93 Proponents of
the Cures Act routinely presented the Cures Act in a
compassionate light, arguing that patients with life-threatening
illnesses could wait no longer.
Critics of the Cures Act, however, painted a very different
picture of the Act. Critics were vocal in their opposition and even
sent Congressional members a letter to urge them to reconsider
hastily passing the bill.94 They argued that (1) the bill, as written,
threatened the ability of the FDA do its job by ensuring safety and
quality, and (2) that the provisions were unnecessary, given that
the FDA already used expedited pathways, and even their use was
raising “serious concerns”95 In the end, however, the
pharmaceutical industry came out with a victory. Given the Cures
Act’s support and funding for other noteworthy causes,96 one can
see how the FDA provisions managed to sneak their way in. Other
critics of the Cures Act, including Diana Zuckerman, the president
of the National Center for Health Research, a non-partisan think
tank, took a stab at the bill, citing the irony of its name.97
Zuckerman was quoted as saying, “The irony is calling this 21st
Century Cures, when they’re talking about standards that were left
behind in the 20th century, because they were found to not be
good.”98
One reason often cited for making the FDA’s drug approval
process less rigorous is that in its current state, it stifles the
discovery of new drugs and innovation. Critics of this reason,
93

Id.
21st
Century
Cures
Act
Letter
(Oct.
26,
2016),
https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/21st-Century-CuresAct-letter.pdf.
95
Id.
96
See INTRODUCTION, supra PART I.
97
Carolyn Y. Johnson, This Bill Promises to Speed up Drug Approvals So
Much That It’s Making People Uncomfortable, WASH. POST, (Jul. 10, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/08/this-bill-promisesto-speed-up-drug-approvals-so-much-that-its-making-peopleuncomfortable/?utm_term=.801765c95739.
98
Id.
94

APRIL 2016]

21st Century Cures Act

423

however, offer different explanations. Jerry Avorn, a professor at
Harvard Medical School presented his theory on the lagging
innovation in drug development.99 Avorn was quoted as saying,
If there’s a shortfall in drug development, it is mostly
because the companies have lost their verve in their ability
to discover new drugs . . . Lowering FDA standards for
approving drugs and antibiotics without evidence of
clinical benefit -- I don’t think that’s going to help, but it
could also harm patients. What we don’t need is more
drugs approved based on lab tests instead of patient
benefit.100
The Cures Act presents a stark contrast in viewpoints, with
patients and pharmaceutical industry stakeholders on one side, and
on the other, physicians.
IV: THE FUTURE OF DRUG REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW
THE CURES ACT’S EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS FOR DRUG
APPROVALS WILL UNDERMINE SAFETY AND INNOVATION
This section provides an in-depth discussion and analysis of the
key provisions of the Cures Act relating to evidentiary standards
for drug approvals and the impact of these provisions on safety and
innovation. Part A discusses the use of real-world evidence to
support the FDA’s decisions. Part B discusses the use of patient
experience data in the review process. Part C discusses the Act’s
mandate on drug development tools in drug development and
review. Part D discusses the overall implications these three
provisions will have on drug regulation.
A. “Real-World” Evidence: Waning Significance of the Clinical
Trial
As discussed in Part II,101 when determining whether a certain
drug will be approved during the NDA period, the FDA makes its
determination based on data from clinical trials. Under the Cures
Act, for drugs that have already been approved by the FDA but are
99
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101
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now being considered for a new indication, the agency can utilize
real world-data in its assessment.102 This provision, however,
though it provides flexibility in gathering data for review, may
prove to be ultimately harmful in the end. In its attempt to
incorporate real-world evidence into the FDA’s regulatory
approval process, the Cures Act represents perhaps one of the most
significant moves in clinical trial flexibility in the agency’s history.
Real-world evidence can come in a variety of forms, and its use
in the drug approval process can pose noteworthy concerns. Realworld evidence, according to the Cures Act, is “evidence from
clinical experience, mean[ing] data regarding the usage, or the
potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other
than randomized clinical trials, including from observational
studies, registries, and therapeutic use.”103 While the Cures Act
does not purport to do away with the clinical trial requirement, it
does bring into question the future of randomized clinical trials,
given that real-world evidence can now be used as a tool for
review by the FDA, and can quicken the approval process.104
For some patients, incorporation of real-world evidence into
the FDA’s review process seems like a victory.105 As FreemanDaily106 points out, clinical trials are not always convenient or even
possible to conduct due to the low volume of people living with a
particular rare disease.107 According to Freeman-Dailey’s account,
They’re [referring to the Cures Act] talking about
accelerating approval of drugs for patients with rare
diseases and oncogene-driven cancers like mine. Many of
these are conditions are infrequent; it would be extremely
difficult if not impossible to collect sufficient numbers of
patients for separate clinical trials of each drug in each
condition. The nearest trial for me is one thousand miles
away, in Denver . . . Many patients can’t travel. That’s why
102
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greater flexibility in trial design for evaluating precision
medicine drugs is needed . . . 108
The use of “real-world evidence” in the drug approval process,
though wrought with controversy in many ways, however, could
be useful in a number of areas, including its use in tracking
observational data, a major issue that often arises in the area of offlabel drug use.109 Under the current framework, physicians who
prescribe off-label are not required to record the purpose for which
a particular drug is prescribed.110 Under the Cures Act, however,
medical professionals may be incentivized to share data from
observational studies for drug-promotion if the data can help in the
approval process for a drug. Tracking observational data is
particularly important because it can provide additional
information to researchers, including what purposes doctors are
prescribing the off-label drug for, and who they are prescribing it
to.111 This information could then could used by researchers to
evaluate whether the drug is safe and effective for the prescribed
uses, which would save researchers both time and expenses in
beginning with clinical trials.112 Alternatively, tracking
observational data also serves a policing function for improper offlabel drug promotion. Particularly, the ability to track
observational data becomes useful in situations where doctors are
prescribing off-label drugs when the drug presents little benefit, yet
high risk, or if there are actual safe and effective existing
therapies.113 However, tracking observational data may
alternatively be achieved by incorporating diagnostic codes that
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include the particular purposes for which a drug is being used into
Medicare claims.
Despite the potential incentive to track data from observational
studies, many argue that the incorporation of real-world evidence
into approval processes will do more harm than good.114 According
to scholars, assessing efficacy based on observational data is
“subject to numerous forms of bias and unmeasured confounding,
which would obscure the true benefits and risks of drugs and
devices.”115 Real-world evidence can largely be problematic
because it is not collected with the intent to support research, and
thus is not “optimized” for research support.116 Another issue posed
by using real-world evidence is privacy issues.117 Sharing
electronic health information from patients who have not
consented can present significant issues for both the disclosing
entities and those receiving the data. 118
Assessing the benefits of incorporating real-world evidence
into the drug approval process, however, requires further
addressing the limitations of clinical trials. Among a number of
concerns that have been identified include, patient recruitment and
114
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retention, informed consent issues, gaining Institutional Review
Board approval, a “shrinking” clinical research workforce, and the
costs of clinical trials.119
Real-world evidence, indeed, from patients like Freeman-Daily
and others, may seem to be valuable in that data would be more
easily generated than it could be from a clinical trial. This
provision of the Cures Act could also save researchers a lot of time
and money when it comes to gathering data. On the other hand,
however, ease in generating data using real-world evidence will
come at an expense, and that expense is ensuring that the drug’s
safety and effectiveness is supported by reliable data. Ancillary
concerns include the privacy ramifications of using data from
patients who have not consented to sharing of that data. Further, it
will delay the development of drugs that have gone through the
rigorous clinical data-driven review process that presents a greater
guarantee of effectiveness.
B. Incorporating Patient Experience into the Review Process
The Cures Act also aims to incorporate “patient experience”
into the review process for drugs.120 For the purposes of the
provision, “patient experience data” is defined as including data
that,
(1) are collected by any persons (including patients,
family members and caregivers of patients, patient
advocacy organizations, disease research foundations,
researchers, and drug manufacturers); and
(2) are intended to provide information about patients’
experiences with a disease or condition, including—
(A) the impact of such disease or condition, or a related
therapy, on patients’ lives; and

119

See Rebecca A. English et al., Transforming Clinical Research in the
United States: Challenges and Opportunities (2010), INST. OF MED. 20,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50892/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK50892.pdf
.
120
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3001, 130 Stat. 1033
(2016).

428

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 409

(B) patient preferences with respect to treatment of such
disease or condition.121
Upon examination of the definition provided in the Cures Act,
“patient experience” data seems to be very broad.
Patient experience data can be useful, but as a supplement to
clinical trials. Patient-reported outcomes (“PROs”) can play an
important function in the drug approval process.122 FDA
statisticians have described some of the advantages, including the
ability of PROs to capture “how a patient feels and functions
directly from the patient.”123 Another benefit derived from patient
experience data includes the ability for the patient to be more
involved in their care.124 Dr. Janet Woodcock, the director of the
U.S. FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research was cited as
saying that the Cures Act would allow researchers to “collect data
from a broad range of patients in a ‘structured way,’
including details about the burden of their disease and what matters
to them. This reflects the ‘societal shift from the doctors telling
you what you have . . . to the patient as a navigator.’”125 Indeed,
patient experience data could allow for approving drugs based on
data from more broad patient bases, which is not always possible
in a clinical trial setting.
On the other hand, patient experience data also has severe
downsides. One critique of patient experience data is that including
personal experience data collected by family members, caregivers,
and the patients themselves can improperly bias the FDA’s
otherwise objective review process.
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C. Qualification of Drug Development Tools
Under the Cures Act, another provision that has raised
concerns is Section 3011, which mandates the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) Secretary to certify “drug
development tools.”126 This section of the paper will briefly
mention the other drug development tools mentioned in the Cures
Act under Section 3011, but it will focus on biomarkers,
specifically surrogate endpoints. According to the provision, a
“drug development tool” is defined as a “(A) biomarker, (B) a
clinical outcome assessment, (C) and any other method any other
method, material, or measure that the Secretary determines aids
drug development and regulatory review for purposes of this
section.”127 The Act previously defined a “biomarker,” as “a
characteristic (such as a physiologic, pathologic, or anatomic
characteristic or measurement) that is objectively measured and
evaluated as an indicator of normal biologic processes, pathologic
processes, or biological responses to a therapeutic intervention;
and includes a surrogate endpoint.”128
First, it is important to recognize that using surrogate endpoints
does, in fact, offer significant benefits, and Section 3011 of the
Cures Act can help realize these benefits. One of the reasons
biomarkers are used is because they are cheaper and easier to use
than clinical endpoints.129 The measurements from biomarkers can
also be measured more quickly.130 Another advantage with using
surrogate endpoints is that they can avoid many of the ethical
issues posed by measuring clinical endpoints.131
126
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Surrogate endpoints, however, have been found to be very
problematic.132 Surrogate endpoints, despite their benefits, are like
the Cures Act itself: sacrificing safety and reliability for speed.133
The FDA has even acknowledged the problem with using
surrogate endpoints, citing that the use of surrogate endpoints
alone fail to capture the total “picture of benefit and risk of a
therapy.”134 Some of the limitations of using surrogate endpoints,
according to the FDA, include:
For example, surrogate endpoints may sometimes fail to
predict the overall benefit and/or risk for a medical product.
These limitations underscore the importance of continued
evaluation in the post-market phase when products are
approved based upon surrogate endpoints that have not
been validated, as well as the need to rigorously evaluate
and sometimes re-evaluate surrogate endpoints clinically.135
Under the Cures Act, however, a much greater use of surrogate
endpoints is encouraged.136 Researchers also point to the harms
associated with relying too much on surrogate endpoints, including
medical and financial harm, citing that surrogate endpoints are not
useful in studying all disease, rather only in cases where the
“pathophysiology of the disease and the mechanism of action of
the intervention are thoroughly understood.” 137
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D. Summary Level Review
Section 3031 of the Cures Act also allows for data summaries
to be used in the drug approval process.138 According to Section
3031:
(A) The Secretary may rely upon qualified data
summaries to support the approval of a supplemental
application, with respect to a qualified indication for a
drug, submitted under subsection (b), if such supplemental
application complies with subparagraph (B).
(B) A supplemental application is eligible for review as
described in subparagraph (A) only if-(i) there is existing data available and acceptable to the
Secretary demonstrating the safety of the drug; and
(ii) all data used to develop the qualified data
summaries are submitted to the Secretary as part of the
supplemental application.139
Data summaries are defined as a “summary of clinical data that
demonstrates the safety and effectiveness of a drug with respect to
a qualified indication.”140 In randomized clinical trials, “metaanalysis of individual patient data is regarded as the gold standard
in systematic reviews.”141 However, researchers are incentivized to
deviate from analysis of individual data for three key reasons,
including the cost, time, and difficulty associated with obtaining
individual-level data.142
According to critics, however, data summaries present great
potential for manipulation by manufacturers. According to Aaron
Kesselheim, Associate Professor of Medicine at Harvard
University,
At present, the FDA usually examines all data put forward
to support drug approval, including supplemental
138
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indications. This herculean effort has proven necessary
because manufacturers have sometimes been found (often
through litigation) to summarize their data in ways that
excessively emphasize benefits of their products and
minimize risks.143
Greater use of data summary in the approval process, per the
Cures Act, poses a threat to patient safety.
E. A Step Back in Time?
Each of the three sections of the Cures Act provide for
significant changes in the drug approval process. While each
individually poses benefits, these benefits do not outweigh the
risks associated with relying on less rigorous data for drug
approval. Benefits, such as cost-saving and efficiency are
noteworthy. However, where public health disasters are at stake,
these benefits cannot supersede the FDA’s duty to protect public
health by approving only those drugs that have been adequately
and rigorously tested and are based on rigorous data.
As the drug and device provisions indicate, quick delivery as a
goal seems to be gaining traction among the FDA’s review
processes. While the randomized clinical trial is here to stay, it
remains questionable how much significance the FDA wields
given that new forms of review tools, like real-world evidence and
a greater reliance on surrogate endpoints and patient experience,
with less stringent standards are now available for the FDA’s use.
These provisions of the Cures Act, indeed, may represent a step
backwards for the FDA. Given the agency’s past history, this may
present itself to be a dangerous step.
V: BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND NECESSARY REFORMS FOR A
LESS THAN IDEAL SYSTEM OF DRUG APPROVALS AND RECALLS
The Cures Act will redefine the game when it comes to getting
drugs on the market. However, the Cures Act is also wrought with
real implications, many of which will be harmful to the future of
safe and effective drugs. There are concerns about how patients
143
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will fare under the Cures Act, with the potential that they will now
be exposed to treatments and devices that have not been adequately
tested and whose risks and safety concerns are not completely
known. There are concerns that the intrusion of less rigorous data,
such as patient experience data into the review process will erode
trust in the FDA’s approval process.
One of the biggest issues with the Cures Act’s provisions on
evidentiary standards for drug approvals, however, can be viewed
through the lens of the current framework for drug recalls and
through an analysis of the FDA’s effectiveness and diligence in
adequately monitoring post-market approval studies. The standalone drug provisions in the Cures Act by themselves are
controversial, but coupled with a slow and lengthy drug recall
process, and inadequate post-market approval studies by the FDA,
the problem is magnified. Provisions like the ones in the Cures Act
that speed up drug approvals demand urgent mechanisms for
addressing the ramifications that can result from approvals based
on less reliable data. Currently, the FDA’s mechanisms for
addressing drugs that pose risks after approval are inadequate.144 If
a drug that has been approved based on using the methods in the
Cures Act presents danger, the “back-end” procedures must be in
alignment with the “front-end” procedures, ensuring that the drug
can be removed quickly, or that the manufacture can remedy the
problem before it causes more harm.145
For low-income patients, the Cures Act will even pose more of
a risk.146 Physicians, who are given samples by drug companies,
often give low-income patients these samples for free.147 While this
seems at first glance a controversial practice, it is also a means by
which low-income patients can access drugs that may help them
that would otherwise be unavailable to them.148 However, the main
dilemma is that the free samples tend to be drugs that have been
144
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newly approved.149 According to Dr. Reshman Ramachandran, an
assistant scientist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Institute of
Public Health,
The concern [I have], especially for underserved
populations, is that the things we have in our back pocket—
through sample closets or discount cards—would be
approved based on a lower standard,” she said. “It’s a bad
mix—giving our underserved populations access to
potentially unsafe and ineffective drugs.150
Approvals under the Cures Act will put an already
disadvantaged population in harm’s way, posing both safety and
ethical implications.
Beyond safety and efficacy concerns, the bill also raises other
dilemmas, including financial waste. If treatments are not adequate
and rigorously tested and lack strong scientific support, insurers
may potentially dole out resources for treatments that may prove
later to be medically ineffective.151 Relatedly, many proponents of
relaxed regulatory burdens on drugs entering the market argue that
doing so will actually bring down the alarmingly high costs of
prescription drugs.152 Their argument follows that introducing
multiple drugs into the market that treat the same condition will
create competition and decrease prices.153 However, this has not
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been the case.154 On a similar note, expedited drug approval and
development also will result in financial waste of government
resources.155
The Cures Act may also present opportunity for product
liability suits when persons are harmed by taking a drug that has
been approved based on less rigorous data. This problem is
particularly amplified in light of the public’s general
misconception regarding FDA approval to begin with.156 Many
patients do not fully understand what the FDA’s “seal of approval”
means.157 According to a study by researchers regarding the
meaning of FDA approval, patients had several misconceptions
about FDA approval, including, (1) that the FDA approves only
those drugs that are extremely effective, (2) that the FDA does not
approve drugs with serious side effects, and (3) that the FDA only
allows those drugs that are ‘extremely effective’ to be
advertised.”158 The general problem seems to be that FDA approval
is demonstrative of efficacy level certification.159 The public’s trust
in “FDA approval” may be sorely misplaced when FDA approval
processes under the Cures Act accept less rigorous data, a fact
which consumers may be unaware of.
Finally, another concern surrounds the question of what the
Cures Act means for the direction of regulation moving forward
and the legitimacy of the FDA. In an era in which the current
administration has already taken a strong approach towards
deregulation,160 the safety and effectiveness of drugs remains an
154

Id. at 9 (“For instance, although 11 major drug alternatives to treat multiple
sclerosis have entered the market over the past two decades, all of them are
priced in roughly the same high-cost range. These manufacturers have not
attempted to undercut each other’s prices in order to gain market share”).
155
Kesselheim et al., supra note 62, at 5.
156
Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Gatekeepers, 47 IND. L. REV. 363,
387 (2014).
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 388.
160
Katie Thomas, Trump’s FDA Pick Could Undo Decades of Drug
Safeguards,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/health/with-fda-vacancy-trump-seeschance-to-speed-drugs-to-the-market.html?_r=0.

436

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 409

issue. The Trump Administration’s executive order, promulgating
that for every new government regulation, the government must
get rid of two existing regulations, also presents significant
uncertainty about the implementation of the Cures Act, particularly
as to how much its implementation will be delayed.161 The Cures
Act’s representation of a continued trend towards lax regulation
may very well undermine the objective of the FDA: to promote
and protect public health.
On the other hand, the FDA’s management of the clinical trial
process has also been imperfect and demands the agency’s
attention.162 In a 2015 study, researchers found that the FDA was
not transparent in communicating findings to the scientific
community about deviations from “good clinical practice and
research misconduct” the FDA discovered from inspecting clinical
sites doing research on human participants, resulting in reliance on
data from faulty clinical trials.163
VI: CONCLUSION
While the FDA drug approval process could benefit from
reforms that might bring therapies to the market quicker, the
provisions in the Cures Act may run counter to their very intent: to
give patients access to effective drugs and therapies and to
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encourage innovation. Drugs that have not undergone the rigors of
the usual FDA process characterized by the controlled clinical trial
present significant safety risks to the patients the agency is tasked
with protecting. Further, allowing drugs to be approved based on
less rigorous standards delays the development of other drugs that
have undergone the rigors of a controlled clinical trial and are
more likely to pose less safety and efficacy issues for patients.
Real-world evidence, drug development tools like biomarkers,
and patient experience data have presented benefits that the clinical
trial itself cannot achieve, including flexibility, ease in generating
data, and cost-cutting results. However, none of these can serve as
substitutes for controlled clinical trials, even with their
imperfections.
Until the current system of drug recalls is improved and postmarketing approval studies are better monitored and conducted,
further loosening of drug approvals standards will not solve the
problem of stifled drug development and innovation. If the trend to
reduce burdens upon drug sponsors when initially approving a
drug continues, then removal procedures must be proportional in
order to ensure that potentially unsafe and ineffective drugs can be
removed from the market. Additionally, reducing evidentiary
burdens for drug approvals presents a host of other issues, not
limited to privacy, ethical, financial, and reimbursement-related
concerns.
The FDA must balance two competing interests: (1) ensuring
that patients—especially those who are in dire situations—can
access effective drugs and treatments, where other therapies or
alternatives might not exist, and (2) at the same time, ensuring that
the safety and effectiveness of drugs are not being compromised
simply for speed. In the end, the FDA is presented with the quality
versus quantity and access dilemma and must remember to stay
true to its objectives.

